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Abstract 
The General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) is a trade promoting program offered by the EU to 
several developing countries. An extension of the program, GSP+, offer more beneficial 
market access contingent on positive conditionality. I use the gravity equation to estimate 
effects on export flows for the participants when changing from GSP to the more generous 
GSP+ using a sample of 53 countries over the time period 1988-2006. I conduct the 
estimation as a gravity equation estimated with Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood. I find 
insignificant over-all effects of entering the GSP+ program which is contrary to most of 
earlier research. On product level however, the effect becomes significant. For some product 
groups the effect is negative and for some positive. 
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Acronyms and abbreviations 
ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific 
CET: Common External Tariff 
CN: Combined Nomenclature  
DFQF: Duty-Free Quota-Free 
EBA: Everything But Arms 
EEC: European Economic Community 
EU: European Union 
GSP: General Scheme of Preferences 
LDC: Least Developed Countries 
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
HS: Harmonized System  
ILO: International Labour Organisation 
MFN: Most Favored Nation  
PPML: Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
SMC: Southern Mediterranean Countries 
SITC: Standard International Trade classification 
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has been an international forerunner for using unilateral trade 
preferences to boost exports from developing countries. By granting preferential access to 
the inner market of the EU to developing countries through offering tariffs that are lower 
than the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs, beneficiaries can start to export or expand 
existing export industries. Preferential access to developed market is percieved to increase 
trade and promote industrialization in the receiving countries. The EU has implemented 
schemes of trade preferences since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Cirera, Foliano, & 
Gasiorek, 2011).  
The EU currently implements different preferential schemes to different countries 
depending on their level of development and historical ties. The programs I pay attention 
to in this paper are the General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and the extended version 
GSP+.  The GSP offer more preferential access to the inner market of the EU than the 
MFN tariff permits while the GSP+ is an even more favorable version of the GSP. The EU 
uses GSP+ to simultaneously promote trade and core values through positive 
conditionality. By conditioning the additional preferences of GSP+ on whether or not the 
benefiting country ratify agreements and conventions on human rights, child labor, labor 
rights, environmental protection and more, the EU can support these values.  
If it is more profitable for the developing country to have access to GSP+ as compared to 
GSP, they ought to be more inclined to ratify and comply with the conventions in question. 
This is the underlying assumption of the structure of the GSP+; an upgrade from GSP to 
GSP+ results in more trade. In this paper I assess whether this is the case by comparing 
trade flows over time for a number of countries out of which some have upgraded to GSP+ 
during the time period. 
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I will use a gravity model with panel data disaggregated to two digits.  The estimation 
method I use is the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) which is the model 
suggested for gravity equation estimations by Tenreyro & Silva (2006). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter two provides a brief overview of EU trade 
preferences with focus on GSP and GSP+. A theoretical framework is presented in part 
three. Part four contains previous research in the area of trade preferences and in part five I 
present my empirical analysis, the data and method and the results. Lastly, I conduct a 
discussion and present some conclusions.  
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2. Overview of EU trade preferences 
Trade preferences are a form of trade enhancing policy measures that are widely 
implemented across the world. Today all developed nations use some form of trade 
preferences, and the EU has the most generous version. Trade preferences are reductions to 
the general import tariffs, or the MFN rate. 
The GSP comprises of different parts and I will limit myself in this paper to investigation 
the general preferences, GSP, and one type of additional preferences, namely GSP+. The 
GSP+ works through positive conditionality meaning that the EU poses certain demands 
on countries before they can access the preferences. The EU has a history of promoting 
good governance and sustainability and GSP+ is a natural continuation of that tradition. 
The future of this tradition however, depends on whether or not the additional trade 
preferences indeed lead to more trade. This is the reason I want to estimate effects of GSP+ 
in comparison with GSP. Ultimately, the results can say something about the role of the 
EU as promoter of human rights and sustainability in the world, at least within the GSP 
framework. 
Other programs of trade preferences are beyond the scope of this paper but I will shortly 
account for them here. These programs include the Everything But Arms-program (EBA) 
which offers the most generous preferences under the GSP framework to Least Developed 
Countries (LDC). EBA consists of duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) exports to the EU with 
the exception of arms and ammunition. Furthermore, the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries as well as Southern-Mediterranean Countries (SMC), all benefit from 
special trade preferences and aid schemes for historical and geographical reasons. I 
exclude these programs from this paper. 
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In this section I provide a short overview of the historical and legal background of trade 
preferences and a description of GSP and GSP+ today as well as the recent changes to the 
programs and why they were necessary. 
2.1 Historical and legal background of GSP and GSP+ 
The tradition of European trade preferences goes back to the Treaty of Rome and the 
establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The Treaty of Rome 
aimed at creating a common market for the EC and resulted in part in the EEC Common 
External Tariff (CET) which was a protectionist arrangement with some exceptions to 
special imports (cocoa, coffee etc). Former and present colonies were granted beneficial 
access to the inner market of the European Union. This feature is still visible today through 
the ACP-program.  
When African territories declared independence, the first so called Yaoundé Convention 
was established in 1963 and the second in 1969. The Yaoundé Convention followed the 
EEC Treaty closely and dependent territories remained under the Treaty although now as 
reciprocal bilateral arrangements (Persson & Wilhelmsson, 2006).  
Trade liberalization under the EEC Treaty and the Yaoundé Conventions was largely 
reciprocal. This means that the countries of the EEC officially had equal access to the 
associated foreign markets as they had to the common market. As developing countries 
became less important for the EEC trade relations, it became clear that the agreement had 
failed in its objective to assist the participating countries (Bartels, 2007). 
Non-reciprocal trade preferences were first advocated during the first two rounds of United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 and 1968. The idea 
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was for developed nations to grant developing nations trade preferences without expecting 
the same in return (European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, 2004). In the 
second UNCTAD conference in 1968, the Resolution 21 (ii) stated that a  
“generalized, non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences in favor of the 
developing countries, including special measures in favor of the least advanced among the 
developing countries”  
should be recognized and implemented by developed nations. The main goal for the 
preferences was to induce an increase in export revenue for developing countries, to 
promote industrialization and to accelerate economic growth (Persson 2012, Persson 2013, 
Bartels 2007, Grossman & Sykes 2005). 
Resolution 21 (ii) violated the current General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
and could therefore not be implemented. The problem was that the MFN-principle of the 
GATT advocated non-discrimination. Implicitly, this did not allow for non-reciprocal 
programs. The conflict between the Article 1 of GATT and the Resolution 21 of UNCTAD 
has been debated comprehensively and still gives reason for confusion in international 
trade. 
In 1971, a waiver was issued by the name “GSP Decision” with validity for ten years, 
making way for the full employment of trade preferences. The waiver was later on, in 
1979, changed into the permanent “Enabling Clause”1 (Persson, 2013). The establishment 
of the Enabling Clause meant that GSP was fully in action through ten-year programs. The 
GSP has since been altered and updated on several occasions (European Commission 
2004, Grossman & Sykes 2005).  
                                                          
1
 Which also goes by the name “Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation 
of Developing Countries” 
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To begin with, GSP worked principally through import quotas. The system was 
complicated and not up-to-date for which products to be included in the quotas and so 
countries failed to utilize their rightful preferences. Now the GSP works instead through 
tariff modulation for defined product groups. The latest alteration of GSP is effective of 
January 1
st
 2014 (Bartels 2007, Borchert 2009, Grossman & Sykes 2005).  
The GSP+ program has its roots in the “European Union’s Special arrangements to combat 
drug production and trafficking” or the so called “Drug Regime”. This was a trade 
preference tool aimed specifically at drug-producing countries which started in 1991 and 
covered 12 countries. The aim of the program was to steer away from drug production and 
promote trade in other goods. The program included additional preferences on top of GSP, 
especially for agricultural goods, to give incentives for farmers to produce other crops than 
drugs. The Drug Regime is no longer in use but paved way for the GSP+ program that is a 
more general scheme and was implemented starting from 1994. GSP+ is granted to 
countries participating in GSP and complying with international conventions and standards 
concerning mainly environmental and workers’ protection. The EU has a history of trying 
to include human rights clauses in their trade agreements and programs and has had a 
clause on human rights conditionality in all external arrangements since 1992 (Yap, 2013). 
The full list of the 27 conventions included in GSP+ is enclosed in Appendix 1. 
 
2.2 GSP and GSP+ today 
In this subchapter I will attempt to provide a picture over what makes GSP and GSP+ 
different. This is one of the main points in this paper since it is the difference between the 
two that I target in my estimation. Product inclusion and tariffs offered to participants are 
the two most interesting themes. 
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GSP and GSP+ are not trade agreements in the sense that they are contractual and agreed 
upon by two parties. It is rather a program provided by the EU that developing countries 
can be eligible for and can apply for in order to become beneficiaries. Depending on the 
vulnerability of the developing country and its export industry the country can access the 
baseline preferences of GSP or the more generous version EBA. If a GSP country ratifies 
21 conventions on human rights, good governance, sustainability and more it can apply for 
GSP+
2
. The preferential access to the EU market is more beneficial for the GSP+ countries 
than the GSP participants, but less so then the EBA preferences. The non-contractual 
nature of the program means that the EU can unilaterally suspend preferences. This can 
bring about insecurity for the exporting firms, but the preferences are not likely to be 
suspended out of the blue. Additional preferences can be suspended if the beneficiary fail 
to comply with the requirements of GSP+. 
The preferential tariffs are decided on basis of the so called sensitivity of the type of 
products. Products are classified as sensitive or non-sensitive after the CN8-product 
classification. Sensitivity in this sense represents how competitive the industry in the EU is 
(Nilsson, 2002). The product classification for tariffs is down to eight digits. I present the 
product classifications to the two-digit precision and the respective sensitivity of the 
products in Appendix 3.  
The preference program of GSP can be viewed as four sub-programs. The first group 
covers for industrial products, the second group is coal and steel products, the third is for 
agricultural products and lastly one group for textiles. The industrial products are 
furthermore divided into four provision depending on the sensitivity of the products. 
Products from the industrial category (excluded from products defined in the other groups) 
enter the inner market of the EU freely. Around 130 products are excluded, hence 
                                                          
2
 See full list in Appendix 1 
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sensitive. Trade of products in the group for steel and coal is restricted through quotas and 
ceilings to which the preferential import can amount to. Agricultural products are generally 
not duty free but have some tariff reductions. These products are furthermore reviewed on 
a product-basis and may be duty-free but several other restrictions apply. The textile group 
comprises of 91 categories, all of which the general agreement restrict through tariffs and 
quotas, but preferences are nevertheless available (Nilsson, 2002).  
Out of the product lines covered by GSP, 20 percent are duty free and the remaining 
products enjoy preferences amounting to 20-50 percent tariff reductions. These reductions 
apply as long as the country follows the rules set up for the GSP, most notably the rules of 
origin, or a product or country does not “graduate”, that is becomes too competitive to be 
granted preferences (Nilsson, 2002). 
The non-sensitive products are duty-free under the GSP+ and ad valorem tariffs are 
suspended while the ones combined with an ad valorem duty is not. Specific duties are 
furthermore suspended. 
2.2.1 Changes to the programs  
Changes have been done to the GSP and GSP+ programs to make them more effective. 
Extensive evaluation of the GSP instrument has led to the conclusion that the global 
conditions for trade have changed and hence necessitate an update of the GSP. MFN has 
been lowered on several occasions giving rise to preference erosion for the beneficiary 
countries. Preference erosion is the diminishing difference between MFN and preferential 
tariffs. Hence, preferential tariffs must be lowered in relation to MFN in order to remain 
relevant. Furthermore, the difference between entering the GSP program and the GSP+ 
program should be large in order to give incentives to developing countries to comply with 
GSP+ demands. In this study I provide hands-on empirics on whether or not it is trade 
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enhancing for countries to apply to and follow GSP+. The current changes to the programs 
suggest that these incentives are too small, which will be an interesting point as I evaluate 
my results. 
The way the schemes are constructed as far as product inclusion and tariff reductions go is 
important for the success of the scheme. A trade preference scheme works better the larger 
product coverage the program has and the types of products included also matters. The 
inclusion of products of which a country has comparative advantage gives a more positive 
effect on trade volume than inclusion of other products. Nevertheless, comparative 
advantages can change as an economy evolves and preferences often fail to keep up 
(Persson, 2012). The early GSP scheme excluded almost all agricultural products for 
protectionist reasons and since the beneficiaries mostly traded in agricultural goods or a 
few key products, the resulting trade developments showed that GSP can become inapt if 
the relevant products are not covered.  
As beneficiaries of trade preferences have or are on their way to becoming advanced 
economies and other beneficiary countries are still left behind, preference margins erode. 
As a consequence countries with the same market access are becoming more differentiated 
among themselves and more competitive. This causes the developing countries that don’t 
experience as rapid growth to lose out on the competitive advantage first induced by 
preferences. Subsequently the conditions for inclusion in the preference schemes has 
become more limited to avoid that the preferences do not have an actual impact any more.  
The changes of January 1
st
 to GSP take these developments and scenarios describes above 
into account. The changes aim at the countries most in need, to further benefit the countries 
who follow the EU’s ”core principles of sustainable development and good governance” 
and to improve the legality and stability of the agreements (European Commission, 2013). 
14 
 
When the modified regulation comes into place a smaller number of beneficiaries will be 
included in the program than before. The incentives to join GSP+ will be stronger through 
improved market access and the monitoring of the countries’ compliance with the 27 core 
conventions will improve. The efficacy of the EBA scheme is going to be reinforced as the 
GSP scheme becomes more limited and the EBA gains a larger relevance in relative terms. 
This also entails that countries no longer considered developing countries will lose all or 
some of their trade preferences. The transition phase is set out to be three years so that the 
domestic economies will not experience shocks when they change trade preferences 
(European Commission, 2013). 
Some countries will as of January 1
st
 not benefit from all tariff reductions. China, India, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, Thailand and Ukraine will continue to participate in the GSP program 
but only be eligible for preferences within certain sectors due to graduation. 
3. Theoretical framework 
In the theoretical analysis of trade preferences I pay attention to the effects to trade volume 
as that is what I examine in the empirical part of this paper. I examine here trade 
preferences through a partial equilibrium model adapted to my purposes by taking into 
account the situation for GSP countries and the expected change in trade volume for 
countries benefitting from GSP+. This section draws mainly on Grossman & Sykes (2005). 
3.1 Partial equilibrium analysis 
I conduct the partial equilibrium analysis using a graphical representation. The figure 
describes a simple supply-demand relationship in the price-quantity plane representing the 
situation in the GSP+ beneficiary country. I assume that the countries receiving additional 
preferences are small and unable to affect the world price of the traded goods. This is also 
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true in reality as the GSP+ benefitting countries are only thirteen and do not represent a 
significant fraction of total trade.  
P* is the price of the good in question in the market of the preference granting country (the 
price can also represent an index of prices of all traded goods. The effect is nevertheless 
the same). Exporters to this country face the price 𝑃*/(1+tGSP) to which they must sell to be 
competitive. In addition this price will also prevail at the home market of the country 
granted GSP tariffs as no producer would want to sell for a lower price than they can get at 
the export market. Neither are they able to sell at a higher price than in the competitive 
equilibrium. The duties for GSP amounts to tGSP and is the tariff that applies to exports 
before additional preferences are introduced. This is described in Figure 1. 
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When additional preferences are introduced the GSP rate is suspended and the 
beneficiaries sell at price P* on the importing market. As the group of countries with GSP+ 
preferences is small, they do not affect the price in the granting country which hence 
remains at 𝑃*. 
As demonstrated in Figure 1, the exporters with GSP+ preferences can charge a higher 
price and expand their production. The consumption in the GSP+ country diminishes 
because the consumers must pay higher price than before. Exports increase as a 
consequence of both these effects. The welfare gain in the preference receiving country is 
represented by the area between the demand- and supply curves and the both price levels. 
What happens as a consequence of adding GSP+ is a positive effect on exports through 
trade creation (Grossman & Sykes, 2005). 
Gains for the beneficiary country are thus induced by two reasons. Firstly, lower tariffs 
give the producers room to charge higher prices. Secondly the production volume increases 
in the exporting country through the trade creation. Accordingly, preferences can be 
considered a voluntary resource transfer from the granting country to the receiving 
country, or a gift (Persson, 2013).  
3.2 Interpretation in the context of GSP and GSP+ 
Applying the partial equilibrium analysis to my context provides a foundation for what I 
can expect from the empirical analysis. The section above draws on the theoretical 
framework provided by Grossman and Sykes (2005) and is adapted to the GSP and GSP+ 
scenario. The lowered tariffs offered to countries participating in the GSP+ creates the 
effect shown in the partial equilibrium analysis and is interpreted as trade creation.  
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In my empirical analysis I will use this as the interpretation of the coefficient for my goal 
variable, which is the trade effect of entering the GSP+ as a former GSP participant. This is 
important for me as different effects of trade enhancing instruments are differently 
measured. Trade creation and trade diversion for example are two different effects on trade 
flows. Based on the analysis in this chapter, I will contain myself to trade creation. 
4. Previous research 
It is not always evident that trade preferences do the intended job, and some suggest even 
that effects are negative. As demonstrated in the theory part, unilaterally granted 
preferential market access is expected to increase trade volumes and also lead to the 
development of new and more efficient industries due to the margin created by the 
preferences. Furthermore, more investment, higher productivity, diversification of 
industries and increased competitiveness are supposed to be positive effects of trade 
preferences (Cirera, Foliano, & Gasiorek, 2011).  In this section, I will present what 
empiric research tells us about the outcomes of decades of trade preferences and pay 
special focus on trade creation effects rather than other effects such as trade diversion.  
 
Studies can be difficult to compare because some studies measure the value of imports to 
the EU, others measure the volume. Some measure the number of tariff lines covered by 
the different preferences while others consider the de facto utilization rates to convey 
coverage. Furthermore, the preferences are updated at several points in time and most of 
the previous research has not taken into account the most recent changes. I concentrate on 
the studies of trade creation.  
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4.1 Have preferences worked? 
How can we tell if trade preferences have done the intended job? Since we do not know 
how trade patterns would have looked without trade preferences, this is hard to estimate. 
Gravity models, which I shall apply in this paper can produce a counterfactual, that is what 
trade would have looked like in the absence of preferences (Persson, 2013).  
In an early study of trade preferences, Sapir (1981) found positive effects for GSP for the 
years 1973 and 1974 with a trade creating effect of GSP up to 93 percent. Another study, 
by Oguledo and Macphee (1994) identify positive effects of GSP for 1976. For 1973-1992, 
Nilsson (2002) found positive effects for most of the years but not all. For effects of the 
SMC program 1975-2001, Péridy (2005) estimate the trade creation to approximately 38 
percent. Persson and Wilhelmsson (2006) find positive effects for most trade preference 
programs for the time period 1960-2002. Their estimates are lower than the result in the 
studies presented above and estimate around 4 percent trade creation for GSP.  
Some papers have found no significant indicators that preferences always benefit trade. 
Cirero, Foliano & Gasiorek (2011) estimated a small impact on trade creation of GSP. 
When taking trade diversification into account, the effect even turned out negative. This 
signifies that GSP seems to have worked at the intensive margin, meaning the prevailing 
trade flows, but not in the extensive margin. When both margins were included, GSP had 
negative effect on trade. It follows that the measured effect of preferential regimes depends 
on how the regime is measured.  
Another research paper that identifies little or negative effects of trade preferences is an ex-
post comparative analysis of the trade effects for the participants of the American GSP-
program (Özden & Reinhardt, 2004). Two reasons for this are identified. Primarily GSP 
can encourage protectionism in the benefiting country and secondly, the arrangement can 
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be altered due to lobbyism or pressure from exogenous groups. The researchers behind 
these findings go so far as stating that GSP in its current form has failed and they promote 
instead reciprocal trade agreements (Özden & Reinhardt, 2004). On the other hand, the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) that was implemented by the US in 2000, 
has had large positive effects for the import of manufactured goods to the US (Frazer & 
Van Biesebroeck, 2010).  
Relatively few studies have examined the effects of GSP+. One study examining the 
forerunner of GSP+, The Drug Regime, proves the effects to be positive and statistically 
significant. Gross Trade Creation of the drug regime is estimated to around 50 percent 
(Persson, 2004). A study by Persson & Wilhelmsson (2006) that studies the Drug Regime 
estimate the gains in trade to be insignificant compared to using only GSP preferences. 
They further conclude that preferences in general have positive effects on exports but that 
the magnitude depends on the generosity of the preferences. As the Drug Regime and 
subsequent GSP+ are not among the most generous preferences, that may explain the small 
trade creating effects.  
Over all, most findings seem to point toward positive effects on measurable trade flows of 
trade preferences in general. The impression of previous studies is that the effect on trade 
is larger the more beneficial the preferences are. The effect of GSP+ compared to GSP has 
not been estimated before, hence it is difficult to claim anything about its effects. 
 
5. Data and methodology 
Firstly in this chapter I will present the gravity equation which is the model I employ to 
estimate the trade flows and then I move on to present my data. In the following section I 
discuss some estimation techniques and motivate my choice of method after which I 
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estimate the model in some different specifications. The first test the general effect of 
joining GSP+, the second estimates effects based on product group and the third estimates 
the time effect. The last estimation approximates cross section effects rather than the 
changes over time. Hence I will also try the estimation of the general effect on trade flows 
in two specified time periods with a break in 2000. 
I present the results in the last subchapter. 
5.1 Methodology 
The gravity model in its simplest form states that bilateral exports from country i to 
country j are proportional to their GDP and bilateral distance. Anderson (1979) developed 
the theoretical foundation for the gravity model and Sapir (1981) was one of the first 
papers to use the gravity model with cross-sectional data to estimate effects of the GSP 
scheme. 
Historically and empirically, the gravity model has been very successful and complies with 
theories of trade such as the Heckscher-Ohlin, the Ricardian approach and the model with 
increasing returns to scale (Nilsson, 2002).  The model was questioned theoretically in the 
1980’s but is since then the standard work horse of trade estimations. 
Cross-sectional data has been common in previous papers, primarily until the 1990’s but 
makes it impossible to control for country heterogeneity. The consequence is that the 
results vary depending on which countries are selected for the estimation which entails 
estimation bias (Gómez Herrera & Milgram Baleix, 2009). Péridy (2005) is an example of 
a study that uses panel data and finds estimates that seem more reasonable in magnitude 
(Persson, 2012). 
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In my study I use panel data. Heterogeneity may be a problem for my data set because 
market access is not solely determined by tariffs. Other barriers to trade are also frequent 
and would make my estimation results biased if I failed to introduce proper control 
variables (Mayer & Zignago, 2005). 
 I control for heterogeneity through two types of fixed effects, one controlling for factors 
that change over time and one controlling for country specific factors.  
Time fixed effects are added to the model to capture effects that vary over time but are 
shared by all countries, such as a business cycle effects (Mátyás, 1997). The time fixed 
effects works as one dummy for each year which always takes the value zero except for 
trade occurring during the year denoted by the dummy. Time fixed effects makes the 
model more flexible in the case of a non-linear relationship compared to how the model 
would have behaved with a time trend for example. 
I further include fixed effects for each country, so called within estimation for country 
specific effects. This captures effects stemming from development of trade related market 
measures such as market access and international openness, or changes in unobserved 
heterogeneity such as supply capacity or competitiveness for each specific country 
(Persson & Wilhelmsson 2007, Bun & Klaassen 2003). In addition to controlling for 
country heterogeneity, this also control for multilateral trade resistance which is a type of 
border effect, that is what effects the border itself has on trade between two countries 
(Anderson & van Wincoop 2001, Gauto 2012). A within estimation for country specific 
effects makes the model more flexible compared to employing country-pair effects. 
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The model I test is the following:  
              (  )   𝑃  
    𝑃  
  𝑃    
  𝑃    
        
   
    (                                                       
+                                                      𝑃    ) 
   (          )        
My dependent variable Imports is bilateral trade volume which is imports to EU15 
countries (i) from GSP-participating countries (j). GDP is GDP per capita based on 
purchasing power parity for country i or j respectively where t denotes the year of the 
observation. Population is represented by the variable Pop with index t for time and i and j 
respectively for reporter and importer countries. GDP and population are proxies for the 
size of supply and demand in respective countries. Distance is the traditional proxy for all 
types of barriers to trade over borders and I have included that in my parameters as the 
variable Dist. Since distance is not sufficient for estimating economic trade barriers I 
include traditional gravity variables. For a common language between the trading partners 
I have two variables; Comlangoff for official common language and comlangethno for 
ethnic common language. A shared border is expected to have a positive trade effect and is 
here the variable Contig. The same effect is anticipated for the occurrence shared colonial 
history of trading partners; colony is the variable for colonial history before 1945, col45 for 
colonial history continuing after 1945, and curcol for current colonial relationship, 
furthermore, the variable smctry denotes if the countries have ever been the same country.  
Data over GDP per capita and population comes from the IMF data base (April 2014) and 
the gravity variables comes from CEPII database (April 2014). The trade data comes from 
United Nations Comtrade Database (June 2014). 
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The variable μ denotes the country fixed effects with index j for each country; the variable 
λ is the time fixed effect with index t for each year. The variable τ represents the ten 
different product categories in the data with the index k taking any value between 0 and 9. 
The error term has indices for importing countries (i), exporting countries (j), time (t) and 
product category (k). 
The way to define the trade regime or the trade preferences differs widely between studies. 
In some previous studies of the EU trade preferences a dummy is used for the examined 
preferences, for example in Nilsson (2002) and Péridy (2005). The dummy is then 
interpreted as both gross trade creation and trade diversion (Persson, 2004). One way to 
separate between the two effects or the so-called “intra-bloc” trade is to use three dummies 
as in Soloaga and Winters (2001). Through this method they authors can separate between 
trade within the countries that share an agreement, imports from all countries in the world 
and thirdly, the exports from participating countries to the rest of the world. I do not have 
such extensive data and thus exclude this method. Others employ a continuous variable 
approach for the trade regime using preference margins estimated by actual utilization of 
the preferences as a way to control for country heterogeneity and the trade preferences 
simultaneously (Nilsson & Matsson 2009, Magrini, Montalbano, & Ninci 2014, Hoekman 
& Nicita 2008). This is a faulty strategy since using utilization rates entails that the 
dependent variable is present at the right hand side of the regression and would produce 
inconsistent results.  A fourth approach is to use instruments for the trade preferences. 
Some researchers point out problems with endogeneity between trade flows and trade 
policies which necessitates the use of an instrument (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). My 
variable for additional trade preferences takes the form of a binary dummy. The dummy is 
constructed so that countries using Drug Regime preferences or later GSP+ are captured, 
by letting the dummy take the value one from the entry-year and the following years. A 
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table describing each member’s enter date is provided in Appendix 4. The preceding trade 
scheme Drug Regime offered similar tariff reductions and this is why it also is included in 
the dummy.  The interpretation of the dummy is gross trade creation of the extended 
preferences. 
For all dummies, one is excluded to avoid complete collinearity but the software Stata 
which I use automatically excludes variables that show collinearity so I need not worry 
about this aspect. Multicollinearity is not an issue with panel data (Gómez Herrera & 
Milgram Baleix, 2009). 
5.2 Data 
The data that I use is UN import panel data for EU14 and is disaggregated at the product 
level to two digits. In attempts with more disaggregated data, the data set became too large 
to estimate in Stata. Thus I had to resort to less disaggregated data. This is unfortunate 
because I will receive less detail in my results. The main findings will not be affected 
however. The data is ordered by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). It 
is balanced data and covers the period 1988-2006
3
.  
Tariffs employed by the EU are defined at the 8-digit precision and the EU uses the 
classification system Combined Nomenclature (CN), called CN8. CN8 comprises of the 
Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature, community subdivisions called CN subheadings 
and preliminary provisions in accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87. 
Import data with the CN8 classification was at the time of my estimation unavailable 
despite many trials at obtaining the data and so I have used the UN data classification 
instead. This slightly complicates the procedure of calculating the effects of the GSP+ 
                                                          
3
 Trade data is missing for Cook Islands, Micronesia, Niue, Nauru, Moldova and Marshall Islands. 
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program on the product level as product lines are differently specified. It does not affect 
the general effect of GSP+ on trade.  
Countries that have additional preferences, meaning the ACP and SMC-countries, are 
excluded from the data set. I choose to do this because the preferences become overlapping 
and exporting firms can use any of the tariffs available to them. This makes it difficult to 
distinguish the effect of the GSP+ program. Furthermore and more significantly, these 
agreements are generally more beneficial for the participating countries and so there is 
little reason to believe they would use the GSP preferences anyway. Even if a country 
within the ACP or SMC group were eligible for the GSP+-preferences, it is not certain that 
would be preferable for them either (Persson & Wilhelmsson, 2006).  The GSP countries 
serve as control group. For a list of all countries in my data set, see Appendix 2. 
5.3 Estimation 
Several different estimation techniques are available for estimating the gravity equation. 
Here I use the PPML method. 
A common problem in the estimation process is the zero value of trade flows, which is the 
event of no trade between two partners at a certain point and for a certain product. Since 
my data contain a large amount of zero flows, I will briefly discuss how this can be 
handled methodologically. Zero flows can depend on trade being unobservable or on the 
exporter’s decision to not sell  (Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein, 2007). Some possible 
estimations techniques are at hand. Elimination of zero flows through truncation is one 
solution but lacks theoretical support and evidently results in huge losses of information. 
Many other solutions exist; Tobit estimation, Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS), Feasible 
General Least Squares (FGLS) and maybe most notably the Heckman sample selection 
model of Helpman, Melitz and Rubenstein (2007). This method might be a good estimator 
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but necessitates joint normality in the estimated residuals. It is furthermore insensitive to 
heterogeneity of products and countries. (Gómez Herrera & Milgram Baleix, 2009). The 
PPML method also deals well with zeroes in the data set, according to Cirera, Foliano and 
Gasiorek (2011). Moreover, Tenreyro & Silva (2006) compare their results using a PPML 
technique to Monte Carlo simulations and find that their model outperform most other 
estimators. Also Westerlund & Wilhelmsson (2009) support the Poisson ML estimator. 
I furthermore rule out the log-linearized method which is the method most commonly used 
based on the argument by Tenreyro & Silva (2006) that the log-linearized model produces 
biased estimates. In addition, as I have included the zero flows the exponential form 
becomes impossible because the logarithm of zero is undefined (Gauto, 2012). Instead I 
employ a multiplicative exponential form of the gravity equation as can be seen from the 
model specification above.  
Admittedly, the inclusion of fixed effects and control variables amount to high 
computational costs. But as the number of observations exceeds 450000, I am not too 
concerned about this.  
As a first approach, I try the general effect of GSP+ on all trade. I then move on to testing 
it for the different product groups as defined by SITC classification. This must be handled 
with care because the SITC and HS8-classifications differ and can give spurious results. 
Thirdly, I will include the time aspect and estimate whether the effects on trade have been 
different at different points in time. 
5.4 Results 
The number of observations is 484217 and the number of parameters is 86 in the baseline 
regression but varied depending on model specification.  
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The estimation results are presented in Table 1. As could be expected, the coefficients for 
variables for GDP per capita are positive and significant. The size of the population in the 
exporting country is highly negative in one of the estimations and insignificant in another. 
The population size of the importing country seems unimportant in all estimations, exempt 
in the baseline regression with the GSP+ variable where population size in the exporting 
country seems to have a negative impact on trade. Not unexpectedly, the coefficient of the 
distance variable takes a large negative value and is significant in all three regressions. A 
shared language shows no significant effects on trade flows. Surprisingly however, a 
colonial history between the trading partners before 1945 has a significant and negative 
effect on trade flows. For colonial relationships which have lasted after 1945, the 
coefficients turn out significant and positive.  
The estimate of the coefficient for the GSP+ variable is close to zero on the negative side 
but insignificant. This entails that the over-all effect on trade of gaining access to the 
additional preferences of GSP+ is virtually non-existing. The findings are in contrast with 
most of earlier research and theory. It is furthermore counterintuitive as a more beneficial 
trade agreement should lead to more trade. One reason for the results could be that the 
GSP+ does not only deliver increased preferential access to the EU inner market but it also 
imposes demands in the beneficiaries through the positive conditionality. This could be a 
reason for trade to actually decrease to begin with when the transition process of 
complying with the EU standards (see list in appendix1) is still ongoing. It is not 
unreasonable that a consequence may be that the preferences do not produce more trade. 
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Table 1 
Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
Coefficient Semirob
ust Std. 
Err. 
Coefficient  Semirob
ust Std. 
Err. 
Coefficien
t 
Semiro
bust 
Std. 
Err. 
GDPcap 
(exporter) 
1.3746*** .09833 1.6553*** .10149 1.6415*** .10556 
GDPcap 
(importer) 
1.6133*** .41906 1.5203*** .41548 1.5282*** .42012 
Pop exporter) -2.0276*** .52390 .31209 .33998 .31738 .34171
0 
Pop(importer) 1.9770 1.5268 1.8032 1.5067 1.7978 1.5248 
Dist -2.9183** .26517 -2.9214*** .26341 -2.9230*** .26316 
comlang_off .10201 .32280 .11600 .32140 .11548 .32154 
comlang_ethn .10491 .31533 .08507 .31425 .08543 .31420 
colony -.52566*** .13173   -.52092*** .13031 -.51978*** .13139 
col45 .77751*** .13616 .77688*** .1348 .77572*** .13591 
GSP+ -.00978 .08900 - - - - 
sitc0GSPplus - - 2.0859*** .09278 - - 
sitc1GSPplus - - 1.0761*** .16743 - - 
sitc2GSPplus - - .7588*** .10621 - - 
sitc3GSPplus - - .62574*** .14281 - - 
sitc4GSPplus - - -.68267*** .19143 - - 
sitc5GSPplus - - -.62043*** .13022 - - 
sitc6GSPplus - - -.11777 .11385 - - 
sitc7GSPplus - - -1.2193*** .19084 - - 
sitc8GSPplus - - -1.6516*** .15895 - - 
sitc9GSPplus - - -.07236 .20191 - - 
1989GSP+ - - - - - - 
1990GSP+ - - - - - - 
1991GSP+ - - - - -.0234 .21224 
1992GSP+ - - - - .08442 .17844 
1993GSP+ - - - - -.04152    .17348 
1994GSP+ - - - - .05858   .16820 
1995GSP+ - - - - .10253    .16241 
1996GSP+ - - - - .058312    .14376 
1997GSP+ - - - - .05527     .14086 
1998GSP+ - - - - -.08703    .13981 
1999GSP+ - - - - -.08968    .13827 
2000GSP+ - - - - -.23532    .14459 
2001GSP+ - - - - -.24191    .14769 
2002GSP+ - - - - -.11874     .1380 
2003GSP+ - - - - -.10375     .1454 
2004GSP+ - - - - -.09338    .15048 
2005GSP+ - - - - -.06652    .13949 
2006GSP+ - - - - -.00404    .13761 
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The estimates for interaction variables between GSP+ and the SITC classification groups 
provide differing indications. For product groups zero to three, the effects of GSP+ are 
positive and significant. These are product groups that include live animals and animal 
products, beverages and tobacco, crude inedible materials except fuels, mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials. 
Negative effects are visible for product groups four, five, seven and eight. These groups 
contain animal and vegetable oils and fats, chemicals, Machinery and transport equipment 
and miscellaneous manufactured articles. 
Results are insignificant for the remaining product groups six and nine. In these groups we 
find commodities and transactions not classified according to kind and manufactured 
goods classified chiefly by material. Tariffs do not correspond exactly to these product 
groups which makes it difficult to explain the exact factors for the estimates. In appendix 3 
a list of products classified by SITC is provided along with the corresponding CN8 
classification and the product sensitivity. This provides a basis for comparing results with 
the sensitivity of the products.  
Estimates for interaction variables between GSP+ and year variable are all insignificant. 
Note that the interpretation of the coefficients for these variables differs from the earlier 
cases. Here I see the difference in trade flows in a specific year for GSP+ countries 
compared to the control group that is a cross section estimate as compared to the changes 
over time. It is not unexpected that results are insignificant; GSP and GSP+ countries are 
not necessarily different in their export flows. Nonetheless, dividing the sample into two 
samples and running separate regressions can give an indication of when extended 
preferences have been more or less beneficial. A test of running regressions on estimations 
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from 1988-1999 and 2000-2006 yields a positive but insignificant estimate for the latter 
period and a negative but insignificant effect on the earlier period. Based on these 
arguments, I cannot support any differing effects of the extended preferences over time. 
Three of the GSP+ participants, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, joined the program late, 
in fact later than my data set reaches. This should not bias the results since they were all 
part of GSP before and hence contributes to the control group. When omitting these 
countries from the data set, the results are indeed unchanged for the GSP+ estimate. 
Another robustness test of the data is to exclude control variables which are highly 
correlated with one another. For example several variables for common language are 
bound to have a correlation, as well as the variables for colonial past. When reducing the 
control variables to just on controlling for shared language and one for colonial history I 
receive results similar to before. The coefficient for membership in GSP+ is slightly 
negative and insignificant. 
To check the adequacy of the models I perform a Ramsey RESET (Regression Equation 
Specification Error Test) test. The null hypothesis of the test is no misspecification in 
which case the coefficient of the fitted variable is zero. This means that the fitted value 
would be insignificant if the model has a correct specification. I follow the RESET 
recommendations for PPML of Tenreyro & Silva (2006). The results indicate 
misspecification as the fitted value is significantly separated from zero but shows a value 
close to zero. This is true for the cases of using all gravity variables or leaving some out as 
in the last robustness test. Reasons for a misspecification can be numerous. A Heckman 
Sample Selection model could be interesting (Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein, 2007) or an 
instrument variable approach since exogeneity of the trade preferences cannot be excluded 
(Baier & Bergstrand, 2007).  I leave to further research to test this. 
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Due to lack of previous studies of the GSP+, I cannot compare my results to what others 
have found.  Persson & Wilhelmsson (2006) estimate effects of the Drug Regime, the 
forerunner of GSP+, and fins no significant effect either. They find effects on the more 
generous preference programs or agreements, suggesting that the Drug Regime, or GSP+, 
is simply not beneficial enough to induce increases in trade. Persson & Wilhelmsson 
(2006) further points out that the entry dates to the programme of the countries is not the 
same date as exporting firms start using the preferences. It is furthermore not obligatory for 
firms to use the preferences at all and there is reason to believe that firms are slow at using 
new tariffs or that they never come around to use them at all. This seems especially likely 
if the difference between preferential tariffs and MFN is not very large.  
In contrast to Persson & Wilhelmsson (2006), Nilsson (2002) finds positive trade creation 
effects of the baseline GSP program, not including the extended GSP+. He also estimated 
the trade creating effects as larger the more beneficial the preferences are, Nilsson finds for 
example more positive effects of the Lomé agreement than the general preferences. 
Because I compare trade creation effects of GSP+ using GSP as control group, I cannot 
find support for his findings in this paper, but can underline the possibility that the 
difference between preferences offered within the GSP and within the GSP+ may be too 
small to promote significant effects on trade. 
Additional reasons for why the estimated coefficients are insignificant in this study can be 
numerous. Previous studies have concluded that estimation of preferences with 
disaggregated data produce higher estimates than aggregated trade data (Agostino, Aiello, 
& Cardamone, 2007). This scenario could offer support to my conflicting results, but that 
seems a bit far-fetched. After all, I have data that is disaggregated to the second digit and 
not completely aggregated.  
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Other explanations lie with the importing and exporting firms. For the preference 
benefiting countries to gain from the tariff decrease, importing firms cannot hold too much 
market power and subsequently capture the gains of the preference. Studies find that some 
exporters only capture one third of the preference benefits and sometimes even lower than 
that (Olarreaga & Özden 2005, Persson 2013). It is not impossible that there is a case of 
that here as well.   
Just as conditions in the importing country may affect gains from trade preferences, local 
conditions in the exporting country may play a role. If the export capacity in the benefiting 
country is low and necessary institutions are lacking, then the tariff reduction is not 
automatically a way towards more exports due to supply side constraints (Persson, 2013).  
Moreover, the gradual effect of the preferences on trade flows can be captured by the time 
fixed effects. This could maybe partly explain the insignificance of the general estimate. I 
could have included real exchange rate as a variable to further control for changes in 
competitiveness over time but have chosen not to do so (Persson & Wilhelmsson, 2006). 
That may be a subject for future research.  
An additional aspect that could be interesting for future research are the externalities of the 
preferences. From the point of view of a beneficiary country, the question of participation 
is whether the costs of complying with the demands of the GSP+ program are smaller than 
the gains from increased exports. This may seem straight forward, but because some 
countries choose to participate in the GSP+ and some countries choose not to, this can 
create negative externalities for the ones who choose to stand outside. For the outsiders, is 
may well have been better if no positive conditionality was offered to anyone at all 
(Persson, 2013). I do not measure this in this paper but could be interesting for further 
research to look in to. 
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6. Conclusions 
I have in this study estimated the effects of gaining access to the trade preferences of the 
GSP+ program as compared to the GSP program. I have used a PPML estimation 
technique for estimating a gravity equation with panel data covering 53 countries from 
1988 to 2006. My findings are not conclusive but points in the direction of little or none 
effect of GSP+ on trade flows in general and differing effects depending on product group. 
The model shows signs to be specified which signifies the need for further investigation 
into the GSP+ preferences. 
When it comes to implications of my results for the future of trade preferences, it may 
point further towards the path of reciprocal trade agreements. The GSP-program will 
probably not be suspended in the early future but will possibly loose its relative importance 
sooner or later. As tariffs are generally lowered in the world, for example with the TTIP 
negotiations pushing forward, the margins created by the preferential tariffs become 
increasingly insignificant.  
One example of how preferential trade agreements are phased out is the Cotonou 
agreement between the EU and ACP countries which incorporates trade preferences among 
other things. This agreement will be renegotiated in 2020 and may take on a much more 
reciprocal shape.  
Relying on this paper, GSP+ does not have much future as a trade enhancing tool and thus 
the future for the EU to promote core values through positive conditionality seems limited 
in the current shape. However, I will not draw too many conclusions about the future of 
GSP+ from the seemingly nonexisting impact of GSP+ as compared to GSP based on this 
study. The sample of countries is small and the time period covered also rather short, 
mainly due to the fact that GSP+ has not been around for very long.  
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The changes to GSP that are effective of Januray 1
st
 2014 are of course an indicator that 
the programs have not had the intended effect. It remains to see what the effects will be on 
trade flows when the updated programs kick in.  
As far as policy implications go, I believe the supply side of the economy to be an 
important determinant of the success of preferences, The underlying assumption for 
preferences to work is that the supply side in the receiving country is ready for expansion. 
One cannot exclude that constrictions on the supply side limits the possibilities to growth 
thanks to trade preferences. In that case, investments must be made in the beneficiary 
country so that preferences can be fully utilized.  
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Appendix 1: the GSP+ conventions 
Annex VIII of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of 31 October 2012 
 
Core human and labour rights UN/ILO Conventions  
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)  
2. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)  
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)  
4. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1966)  
5. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)  
6. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984)  
7. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)  
8. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930)  
9. Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 
No 87 (1948)  
10. Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to 
Bargain Collectively, No 98 (1949)  
11. Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of 
Equal Value, No 100 (1951)  
12. Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, No 105 (1957)  
13. Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, No 
111 (1958)  
14. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, No 138 (1973)  
15. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour, No 182 (1999)   
 
Conventions related to the environment and to governance principles  
16. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973)  
17. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987)  
18. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal (1989)  
19. Convention on Biological Diversity (1992)  
20. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992)  
21. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000)  
22. Stockholm Convention on persistent Organic Pollutants (2001)EN L 303/60 Official 
Journal of the European Union 31.10.2012  
23. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998)  
24. United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961)  
25. United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)  
26. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (1988)  
27. United Nations Convention against Corruption (2004) 
39 
 
Appendix 2 
Countries included in the data set. The ones in parenthesis are not included due to lacking trade 
data. 
 
EU15 GSP GSP+ 
Austria China Armenia 
Belgium Colombia Bolivia 
Denmark Congo  Cape Verde 
Finland (Cook Islands) Costa Rica  
France Honduras Ecuador 
Germany India El Salvador 
Greece Irland Indonesia Georgia 
Italy Iraq Guatemala 
Luxembourg Kyrgistan (Moldova) 
Netherlands Maldives Mongolia 
Portugal (Marshall Islands) Pakistan 
Spain (Micronesia) Panama 
Sweden (Nauru) Paraguay 
United 
Kingdom 
Nicaragua Peru 
 Nigeria  
 (Niue)  
 Philippines  
 Sri Lanka  
 Syrian Arab Republic  
 Tajikistan  
 Thailand  
 Tonga  
 Turkmenistan  
 Ukraine  
 Uzbekistan  
 Viet Nam  
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Appendix 3: comparison between the SITC and SN8 
product classifications 
ITC 
SITC 1:st revision 
 
CN8 
 
Sensitive (S)  / Non-
Sensitive (NS) 
0 Food and live 
animals 
Section I Live animals; animal products  
00 Live animals 1 Live animals S 
01 Meat and meat 
preparations 
2 Meat and edible meat offal S 
NS: 0208  Frogs leg’s 
02 Dairy products 
and eggs 
4 Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural 
honey; edible products of animal 
origin, not elsewhere specified or 
included 
S 
03 Fish and fish 
preparations 
3 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs 
and other aquatic invertebrates 
S 
NS: 0301 Live ornamental 
saltwater fish 
    5 Products of animal origin, not 
elsewhere specified or included 
S 
    Section II Vegetable products  
04 Cereals and 
cereal 
preparations 
6 Live trees and other plants; bulbs, 
roots and the like; cut flowers and 
ornamental foliage 
S 
05 Fruit and 
vegetables 
7 Edible vegetables and certain 
roots and tubers 
S 
NS: 0714  Dried potatoes 
etc,  Artichokes etc 
06 Sugar, sugar 
preparations 
and honey 
8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus 
fruit or melons 
S 
NS : 0802, 
0805,0812,0813, 0814 
Nuts of different kinds, 
grapefruits, papaya, dried 
papaya,  dried fruit not 
elsewhere specified and  
Peel of citrus fruit, fresh 
frozen, dried or 
provisionally preserved in 
brine etc:  
07 Coffee, tea, 
cocoa, spices 
& manufacs. 
Thereof 
9 Coffee, tea, maté and spices NS: Coffee, tea, mate and 
spices, with exception of 
coffee;, roasted, not 
roasted, decaffeinated or 
not decaffeinated; coffee 
substitutes; sweet peppers, 
vanilla, cloves, thyme, bay 
leaves, other spices 
08 Feed. Stuff for 
animals excl. 
Unmilled 
cereals 
10 Cereals S 
09 Miscellaneous 
food 
preparations 
11 Products of the milling industry; 
malt; starches; inulin; wheat 
gluten 
S 
    12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; 
miscellaneous grains, seeds and 
fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; 
straw and fodder 
S 
NS:  Lucerne, fescue feed, 
lupine seeds, other forage 
seeds, other vegetable 
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seeds, all used for sowing 
    13 Lac; gums, resins and other 
vegetable saps and extracts 
S 
NS:  Vegetable saps and 
extracts of liquorice 
    14 Vegetable plaiting materials; 
vegetable products not elsewhere 
specified or included 
S 
1 Beverages 
and tobacco 
Section IV Prepared foodstuffs; 
beverages, spirits and vinegar; 
tobacco ets 
 
11 Beverages 16 Preparations of meat, of fish or of 
crustaceans, molluscs or other 
aquatic invertebrates 
S 
12 Tobacco and 
tobacco 
manufactures 
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery S 
    18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations S 
    19 Preparations of cereals, flour, 
starch or milk; pastrycooks' 
products 
S 
NS:  Mixes and dough for 
preparation of certain 
baker's wares, others under 
certain provisions. 
    20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, 
nuts or other parts of plants 
S 
NS: 2008, Pinapples, 
prepared or preserved, 
containing spirits. 
    21 Miscellaneous edible preparations S 
NS: 2101, Extracts, 
essences and concentrates 
of tea and maté, 
preparations based on 
these, inactive yeasts 
    22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar S 
    23 Residues and waste from the food 
industries; prepared animal fodder 
S 
NS: 2308, 2309,  Other 
vegetable materials and 
vegetable waste,  vegitable 
resiues and vegetable by-
products, whether or not 
incertain forms not 
elsewhere specified. Fish 
or marine mammal solubles 
of a kind of animal feeding 
    24 Tobacco and manufactured 
tobacco substitutes 
S 
2 Crude 
materials, 
inedible, 
except fuels 
    
21 Hides, skins 
and fur skins, 
undressed 
    
22 Oil seeds, oil 
nuts and oil 
kernels 
    
23 Crude rubber 
including 
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synthetic and 
reclaimed 
24 Wood, lumber 
and cork 
    
25 Pulp and 
paper 
    
26 Textile fibres, 
not 
manufactured, 
and waste 
    
27 Crude 
fertilizers and 
crude 
minerals, nes 
    
28 Metalliferous 
ores and metal 
scrap 
    
29 Crude animal 
and vegetable 
materials, nes 
    
3 Mineral fuels, 
lubricants 
and related 
materials 
Section V Mineral products  
    25 Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; 
plastering materials, lime and 
cement 
NS 
 
    26 Ores, slag and ash S 
    27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and 
products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances; mineral 
waxes 
NS 
32 Coal, coke and 
briquettes 
    
33 Petroleum and 
petroleum 
products 
    
34 Gas, natural 
and 
manufactured 
    
35 Electric energy     
4 Animal and 
vegetable oils 
and fats 
Section III Animal or vegetable fats and 
oils and their cleavage 
products; etc 
 
42 Fixed 
vegetable oils 
and fats 
15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils 
and their cleavage products; 
prepared edible fats; animal or 
vegetable waxes 
S 
NS: 1515,  Hydrogenated 
castor oil 
43 Animal and 
vegetable oils 
and fats, 
processed 
    
5 Chemicals Section VI Products of the chemical or 
allied industries 
 
51 Chemical 
elements and 
compounds 
28 Inorganic chemicals; organic or 
inorganic compounds of precious 
metals, of rare-earth metals, of 
radioactive elements or of 
isotopes 
NS 
S: 2814, 2815, 2817-2820, 
2823, 2825, 2827, 2830, 
2835, 2836, 2841, 2849, 
2850 Ammonia, anhydrous 
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or in aqueous solution, 
sodium hydroxide (caustic 
soda); potassium hydroxide 
(caustic potash); perox-ide 
of sodium or potassium. 
52 Crude 
chemicals from 
coal, 
petroleum and 
gas 
29 Organic chemicals S 
NS:   2904, 2905-2907, 
2908, 2910-2912, 2913-
2914, 2916, 2917, 2918, 
2919-2920, 2923, 
2924-2926, 2928, 2929-
2930, 2931-2932, 2933, 
2934,2938, 2940-2942 
Sulphonated, nitrated or 
nitrosated derivatives of 
hydrocarbons, whether or 
not halogenated, except for 
products under subheading 
2904 20 00, Glycerol, cyclic 
alcohols and their 
halogenated, sulphonated, 
nitrated or nitrosated 
derivatives, phenols, with 
some exceptions, Etc. 
53 Dyeing, 
tanning and 
colouring 
materials 
30 Pharmaceutical products S 
54 Medicinal and 
pharmaceutica
l products 
31 Fertilisers S 
55 Perfume 
materials, toilet 
& cleansing 
preptions 
32 Tanning or dyeing extracts; 
tannins and their derivatives; 
dyes, pigments and other 
colouring matter; paints and 
varnishes; putty and other 
mastics; inks 
NS  
S: 3204, 3206 Synthetic 
organ colouring matter, 
other colouring matter etc. 
 
56 Fertilizers, 
manufactured 
33 Essential oils and resinoids; 
perfumery, cosmetic or toilet 
preparations 
NS 
57 Explosives and 
pyrotechnic 
products 
34 Soap, organic surface-active 
agents, washing preparations, 
lubricating preparations, artificial 
waxes, prepared waxes, polishing 
or scouring preparations, candles 
and similar articles, modelling 
pastes, ‘dental waxes’ and dental 
preparations with a basis of 
plaster 
NS 
    35 Albuminoidal substances; 
modified starches; glues; 
enzymes 
S 
    36 Explosives; pyrotechnic products; 
matches; pyrophoric alloys; 
certain combustible preparations 
S 
NS: 3502-3506  
Albuminates and other 
albumin derivates, gelatin 
and gelatin derivates, other 
glues of animal origin, 
peptones and their 
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derivatives, other protein 
substances and their 
derivatives, not elsewhere 
specified, 
    37 Photographic or cinematographic 
goods 
NS 
    38 Miscellaneous chemical products NS 
58 Plastic 
materials, etc. 
Section VII Plastics and articles thereof; 
rubber and articles thereof 
 
59 Chemical 
materials and 
products, nes 
39 Plastics and articles thereof NS 
    40 Rubber and articles thereof NS 
6 Manufact 
goods 
classified 
chiefly by 
material 
Section VIII Raw hides and skins, leather, 
furskins and articles thereof; 
saddlery and harness; travel 
goods, handbags and similar 
containers; articles of animal 
gut (other than silkworm gut) 
 
61 Leather, lthr. 
Manufs., nes & 
dressed fur 
skins 
41 Raw hides and skins (other than 
furskins) and leather 
S 
NS: 4106, 4113  Tanned or 
crust hides and skins of 
swine, without hair on, in 
the wet state, split but not 
further prepared exclusions 
under subheading 
41063110,  Leather further 
prepared after tanning or 
crusting, including 
parchment-dressed leather, 
of other animals, without 
wool or hair on, whether or 
not split, other than leather 
under heading 4114 
62 Rubber 
manufactures, 
nes 
42 Articles of leather; saddlery and 
harness; travel goods, handbags 
and similar containers; articles of 
animal gut (other than silkworm 
gut) 
NS 
    43 Furskins and artificial fur; 
manufactures thereof 
NS 
63 Wood and cork 
manufactures 
excluding 
furniture 
Section IX Wood and articles of wood; 
wood charcoal; cork and 
articles of cork; manufactures 
of straw, of esparto or of other 
plaiting materials; basketware 
and wickerwork 
 
    44 Wood and articles of wood; wood 
charcoal 
NS 
    45 Cork and articles of cork NS 
    46 Manufactures of straw, of esparto 
or of other plaiting materials; 
basketware and wickerwork 
S 
64 Paper, 
paperboard 
and 
manufactures 
thereof 
Section X Pulp of wood or of other fibrous 
cellulosic material; recovered 
(waste and scrap) paper or 
paperboard; paper and 
paperboard and articles thereof 
 
45 
 
    47 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous 
cellulosic material; recovered 
(waste and scrap) paper or 
paperboard 
S 
    48 Paper and paperboard; articles of 
paper pulp, of paper or of 
paperboard 
S 
    49 Printed books, newspapers, 
pictures and other products of the 
printing industry; manuscripts, 
typescripts and plans 
S 
65 Textile yarn, 
fabrics, made 
up articles, etc. 
Section XI Textiles and textile articles  
    50 Silk S 
    51 Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; 
horsehair yarn and woven fabric 
S 
    52 Cotton S 
    53 Other vegetable textile fibres; 
paper yarn and woven fabrics of 
paper yarn 
S 
    54 Man-made filaments; strip and the 
like of man-made textile materials 
S 
    55 Man-made staple fibres S 
    56 Wadding, felt and nonwovens; 
special yarns; twine, cordage, 
ropes and cables and articles 
thereof 
S 
    57 Carpets and other textile floor 
coverings 
S 
    58 Special woven fabrics; tufted 
textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; 
trimmings; embroidery 
S 
    59 Impregnated, coated, covered or 
laminated textile fabrics; textile 
articles of a kind suitable for 
industrial use 
S 
    60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics S 
66 Non metallic 
mineral 
manufactures, 
nes 
Section XIII Articles of stone, plaster, 
cement, asbestos, mica or 
similar materials; ceramic 
products; glass and glassware 
 
    68 Articles of stone, plaster, cement, 
asbestos, mica or similar 
materials 
NS 
    69 Ceramic products S 
    70 Glass and glassware S 
67 Iron and steel Section XV Base metals and articles of 
base metal 
 
    72 Iron and steel S 
    73 Articles of iron or steel NS 
    74 Copper and articles thereof S 
    75 Nickel and articles thereof S 
NS:  7505-7507,  Bars, 
rods and profiles of nickel 
alloys, wire of nickel alloys, 
plates, sheets, strip and foil 
of nickel alloys, nickel tube 
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or pipe fitting. 
    76 Aluminium and articles thereof S 
    77 (Reserved for possible future use 
in the Harmonised System) 
S 
    78 Lead and articles thereof S 
    79 Zinc and articles thereof S 
    80 Tin and articles thereof S 
    81 Other base metals; cermets; 
articles thereof 
S 
68 Non ferrous 
metals 
82 Tools, implements, cutlery, 
spoons and forks, of base metal; 
parts thereof of base metal 
S 
69 Manufactures 
of metal, nes 
83 Miscellaneous articles of base 
metal 
S 
7 Machinery 
and transport 
equipment 
Section XVI Machinery and mechanical 
appliances; electrical 
equipment; parts thereof; 
sound recorders and 
reproducers, television image 
and sound recorders and 
reproducers, and parts and 
accessories of such articles 
 
71 Machinery, 
other than 
electric 
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, 
machinery and mechanical 
appliances; parts thereof 
NS 
72 Electrical 
machinery, 
apparatus and 
appliances 
85 Electrical machinery and 
equipment and parts thereof; 
sound recorders and reproducers, 
television image and sound 
recorders and reproducers, and 
parts and accessories of such 
articles 
NS 
73 Transport 
equipment 
Section XVII Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and 
associated transport equipment 
 
    86 Railway or tramway locomotives, 
rolling stock and parts thereof; 
railway or tramway track fixtures 
and fittings and parts thereof; 
mechanical (including 
electromechanical) traffic 
signalling equipment of all kinds 
NS 
    87 Vehicles other than railway or 
tramway rolling stock, and parts 
and accessories thereof 
NS 
    88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts 
thereof 
NS 
    89 Ships, boats and floating 
structures 
NS 
8 Miscellaneou
s 
manufactured 
articles 
    
81 Sanitary, 
plumbing, 
heating and 
lighting fixt. 
    
82 Furniture     
83 Travel goods, 
handbags and 
    
47 
 
similar articles 
84 Clothing 61 Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, knitted or crocheted 
S 
    62 Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, not knitted or 
crocheted 
S 
    63 Other made-up textile articles; 
sets; worn clothing and worn 
textile articles; rags 
S 
85 Footwear Section XII Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, 
sun umbrellas, walking sticks, 
seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops 
and parts thereof; prepared 
feathers and articles made 
therewith; artificial flowers; 
articles of human hair 
 
    64 Footwear, gaiters and the like; 
parts of such articles 
S 
    65 Headgear and parts thereof NS 
    66 Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking 
sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-
crops and parts thereof 
S 
    67 Prepared feathers and down and 
articles made of feathers or of 
down; artificial flowers; articles of 
human hair 
NS 
86 Scientif & 
control 
instrum, 
photogr gds, 
clocks 
Section XVII
I 
Optical, photographic, 
cinematographic, measuring, 
checking, precision, medical or 
surgical instruments and 
apparatus; clocks and watches; 
musical instruments; parts and 
accessories thereof 
 
    90 Optical, photographic, 
cinematographic, measuring, 
checking, precision, medical or 
surgical instruments and 
apparatus; parts and accessories 
thereof 
S 
    91 Clocks and watches and parts 
thereof 
S 
    92 Musical instruments; parts and 
accessories of such articles 
NS 
89 Miscellaneous 
manufactured 
articles, nes 
Section XX Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 
 
    94 Furniture; bedding, mattresses, 
mattress supports, cushions and 
similar stuffed furnishings; lamps 
and lighting fittings, not elsewhere 
specified or included; illuminated 
signs, illuminated nameplates and 
the like; prefabricated buildings 
NS 
    95 Toys, games and sports 
requisites; parts and accessories 
thereof 
NS 
    96 Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 
NS 
9 Commod. &     
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transacts. Not 
class. 
Accord. To 
kind 
91 Postal 
packages not 
class. 
According to 
kind 
    
93 Special 
transact. Not 
class. 
According to 
kind 
Section XXI Works of art, collectors' pieces 
and antiques 
 
    97 Works of art, collectors' pieces 
and antiques 
S 
    98 Complete industrial plant S 
    99 Special Combined Nomenclature 
codes 
S 
94 Animals, nes, 
incl. Zoo 
animals, dogs 
and cats 
    
95 Firearms of 
war and 
ammunition 
therefor 
Section XIX Arms and ammunition; parts 
and accessories thereof 
 
    93 Arms and ammunition; parts and 
accessories thereof 
S 
96 Coin, other 
than gold coin, 
not legal 
tender 
Section XIV Natural or cultured pearls, 
precious or semi-precious 
stones, precious metals, metals 
clad with precious metal, and 
articles thereof; imitation 
jewellery; coin 
 
    71 Natural or cultured pearls, 
precious or semi-precious stones, 
precious metals, metals clad with 
precious metal, and articles 
thereof; imitation jewellery; coin 
NS 
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Appendix 4: Entry date of GSP+ countries 
Country Date of entry into Drug 
Regime and GSP+ 
Armenia 2009 (out of sample) 
Azerbadjan 2011 (out of sample) 
Bolivia 1991 
China - 
Congo - 
Colombia 1991 
Cape Verde 2013 (out of sample) 
Costa Rica 1992 
Ecuador 1991 
Micronesia - 
Georgia 2006  
Guatemala 1992 
Honduras 1992 
Indonesia - 
India - 
Iraq - 
Kyrgyzstan - 
Sri Lanka 2006  
Moldova - 
Marshall Islands - 
Mongolia 2006 
Nigeria - 
Nicaragua 1992 
Pakistan 2002 
Panama 1992 
Peru 1991 
Philippines - 
Paraguay 2010 
El Salvador 1992 
Syria - 
Thailand - 
Tadjikistan - 
Turkmenistan - 
Tonga - 
Ukraine - 
Uzbekistan - 
Venezuela 1995 
Vietnam  - 
 
 
